KDVA’s mission is to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance by advocating for the Alliance and supporting the people who built and serve the Alliance.

"Together for the ROK-U.S. Alliance"
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In these uncertain times, it is comforting and encouraging to know that we can rely on our faith, family, friends, and relationships. Reassuring relationships provide an important sense of security and calm, and that is what we have in the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance has been a reliable source of strength and mutual benefit for both South Korea and the United States, particularly since the days of the Korean War almost seven decades ago. Today in our two countries, we are experiencing changes and disruptions to our daily lives that we have not seen in most of our lifetimes. But one thing has not changed and that is the ROK-U.S. Alliance is standing strong in the defense of the Republic of Korea and guarding American and Korean interests in the Peninsula and the region.

As KDVA looks at 2020 in the 70th (or Platinum) Commemoration of the start of the Korean War, I am inspired by the stories of our Korean War veterans and the Defense veterans who followed them in service to our Alliance. I am thankful for the families who have shared their stories in our “I Know a Korean War Veteran” Campaign. Their collective stories are filled with remembrances of the Korean War, their effects in the veterans’ lives as well as the lives of their families, and the true meaning of why this ROK-U.S. Alliance has stood the tests and challenges of time ... and will do so again and again.

Thank you KDVA members, our sponsors, our supporters, and our partners for working every day “Together for the ROK-U.S. Alliance”!

Sincerely,

Walter L. Sharp
General, U.S. Army (Retired)
President & Chairman
Korea Defense Veterans Association
### Updated 2020 KDVA Activities

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There is no cost to join KDVA. Join today!

www.kdva.vet
My uncle Sergeant Anthony L. Langone (pictured upper left) was a member of Company L, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division. He enlisted in the United States Army at the tender age of 18 on June 21, 1949, leaving the family farm to become a sergeant. Uncle Tony wrote home quite often. In a letter from my uncle written on September 2, 1950 and received on September 12, 1950 by my grandparents, he stated that he had been in battle for 14 days and 14 nights, sleeping in foxholes and advancing against the disadvantages of the monsoon swept country. He was about 12 miles south of Taegu and anticipated an order to move up in the big offensive.

Sadly, he was killed in action on September 15, 1950 at Sobuk-Sun in South Korea at the age of 19. For his leadership and valor, he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart.

My grandparents and their seven other children went to Woburn, Massachusetts City Hall where the Silver Star would be presented in a somber ceremony to my grandfather. I often wonder what would have become of my uncle had he survived, and I wish I had had the chance to know him. I come from a very proud patriotic military family. My grandfather Louis Langone enlisted in the U. S. Army during World War I. Four of my uncles fought in World War II, my dad in Korea as well as cousins who served in the Navy and a nephew who served in Afghanistan.

My father, Private Jeremiah J. Langone (pictured lower left), was a Korean War veteran too. After receiving the news of my uncle’s death, my father wanted to enlist in the Army. Both he and my uncle were very close, being only one year apart in age.

The news of Tony’s death was devastating to him. My grandfather insisted he finish high school first and if the war was still on, he could enlist. In 1953, my father enlisted in the U. S. Army. He was ready to go to Korea.

I can’t imagine what it must have been like to lose a son and then have another want to go in his place. I think my grandmother may have breathed a rather large sigh of relief when they found out my father was not going to Korea. The Army would not send him to Korea due to the loss of his brother.

Instead, my dad was sent to Germany for the remainder of the war. My father always wanted to do something to honor his brother. In 2002, the “Sergeant Anthony L. Langone Square” was dedicated at the corner of East Nichols and Main Street in Woburn, Massachusetts in honor of his memory and service to his nation. He worked on this project for many years before it would come...
to fruition.

Some years later, my father was asked to be on the committee of the Friends of Woburn Veterans. The "Friends of Woburn Veterans" is a group of volunteers established in October 2011 to support various veteran’s projects throughout the city of Woburn. He was fortunate to work on several projects with the group. The first was the All Wars Woburn Honor Roll Wall located on the Woburn Common honoring those who served and sacrificed their lives from the city. He also had a roll in the Military Flag Memorial which was dedicated on November 2, 2019 in North Woburn in memory of S/Sgt. John M. Ferullo.

Sadly, my father did not get to see the completion of the Military Flag Memorial project. We lost him several days later to cancer.

One thing my father taught me was to always respect the flag. He loved this country and always showed his respect for the flag. As a young girl, I always marveled at how he would take his hat off and hold it over his heart at parades when the American flag went by. So, when the flag goes by no matter where I am, I stand with my hand over my heart. I don’t think there are any other colors as beautiful as red, white, and blue.

Freedom is not free. Members of my family fought and one in particular gave his life freely for our freedom. These men are true American heroes in my mind. I thank them and all the men and women who have fought, continue to fight, and those who gave their lives and their service to our country so we can live freely.
“There are so many tanks going through the mountains in North Korea and so many dead bodies on the side of the road that they didn’t stop and pick them up to clear the roadway. They checked for IDs and filed a report, but kept moving. If you wanted to get shot, you stopped … so if we were following some tanks, when the tanks moved, we moved. We didn’t have time to put two and two together.

We were following a tank when we came to an area that was kind of an intersection near Hagaru-ri. I remember that there was a dead body in the middle of the gravel roadway. I was shocked. He was a North Korean or Chinese enemy that had been flattened on the road, having been run over and over by tanks and other vehicles. He was only about six inches thick at this point and looked to be about eight feet tall. He was just like almost make-believe and something that I never expected. Flat. He had been run over so many times by tanks that his body was like a pancake, and there we were walking right over on top of him.

It was the first time I had been that close to a body that had been run over by a tank. I knew he was dead, but still it affected me. He was probably a father and had kids at home. You don’t get over that very easily. I had to just close my eyes, push it out of my mind, and keep going. You can’t imagine how that is when you haven’t been exposed to something like that. I still can’t get that image out of my mind.

I remember thinking that anybody who thinks war is good has something wrong in the head -- I don’t care what outfit he’s with. All that could be done with the dead bodies was to get them out of the way by pushing them off the side of the road and down in the gullies. I also thought, ‘That’s going to stink in the springtime when their bodies start thawing out.’

Submitted by Janice Extrom Sheridan

EXCERPT FROM ROBERT EXTROM’S BIOGRAPHY AS A RADIO OPERATOR, 1ST MARINES, 3RD BATTALION, H COMPANY TO BE PUBLISHED ON THE KOREAN WAR EDUCATOR WEBSITE
Dear Mom and Dad,

Received your letter of the 16th yesterday. We are now 3/4 of Seoul secured. Our Regiment/1st Marine had the privilege and hard task of going through the heart of the city and it was hard with resistance heavy. Our casualties were not too bad though. Yesterday and last night our Battalion was given a rest, much needed. As ROK forces came into Seoul to relieve us for a spell.

Sept. 25th almost spelled doom for this company I’m with. We made a big push the 24th and our flank companies were pinned down by the enemy. Only our H Company could advance. We lost communication with everyone and got lost behind enemy lines and Emplacements. For 16 hours straight we were seeing heavy fire from every side.

Believe me we prayed a lot and someone else must have been praying hard too. For with God’s will did we finally gain communication and fought our way out of the trap back to our lines. But it’s over with now and with yesterday’s rest we’re ready to take the rest of the city. It’s much harder in a city than out in the hills and mountains.

We receive very little, if any, news at all pertaining to the armies down south. But we do believe it won’t be long before this is over. I believe I’ve lost close to 25 lbs so far. But some good meats (not rations) and some sleep would put that back on. Hope you write often. You don’t know how good it is to receive mail over here especially after the past two weeks. I wish I had time to write to everyone individually but that’s impossible.

Hope they write though. The days are warm and the nights very cold. Sure hope we don’t have to fight during the winter months. In another week or so we should be taken off the line and return to a rest camp known as de lousing camp. It sure will be good and get new clothes. If you’d like to send a box, I could use some heavy socks and a muffler. You could add some goodies.

Thinking of you mother and dad and everyone. God bless you all.

All my love, Bob
We (his four children) were not born yet while he was in Korea. In fact, he met our mother after his service ended in 1952. We didn’t know much of his story until later in life … we knew he was a U.S. Marine, but didn’t know about his time in the war because he didn’t talk about it much. We are very proud of his service, and in time we learned so much about his time spent in Korea. However, it’s really hard to imagine the horrific things he saw and endured. He keeps his memories private except for a few details.

How it affected us … in retrospect we didn’t know he was a war hero. We knew he’d been a combat vet. We knew how proud he was to be a U.S. Marine. But, we had no clue what he’d endured because he was so reticent to talk about it.

We also didn’t know that his obsession with perfection was unusual.

HA! From the time we were little, his conversations were peppered with military jargon — “Spit-shine those shoes,” “Use some elbow grease,” “Quit crying. You got nothing to cry about,” and things like, “When you’re in the military, you learn to obey orders.”

He loved a good parade and from his admiration and respect for other veterans, we learned to respect and honor veterans from every war. Heroes return home from war as ordinary citizens with a laudable secret past that lives inside their memory. We knew he relived the war in his mind while trying to be an ordinary model citizen — which he was — but we also knew he had his secrets, and we needed to respect those. Our brother also proudly served as a U.S. Marine.

Dad told us once many, many years ago that he didn’t talk about his Korean War experiences because he didn’t want to glorify war.

As for Dad’s family of origin … his mother posted three flags in her front window to show support for three of her five sons. Two in WWII and one in the Korean War. She was proud of her boys. She would clip articles from the newspapers and save them for each son. She wrote to each one regularly and prayed for their safety as well as the others who served. One served with the 82nd Airborne (508th) paratroopers. He was shot in the jaw and received shrapnel in his leg. We’re sure she was devastated, yet thankful. No doubt, she worried that any day she might hear the knock on the door. By God’s grace, all three sons returned home. (Dad’s mother and father and nine siblings are all gone now.)

The following is a short biographical sketch written for an awards ceremony in our father’s hometown when he was awarded the Heroic Hearts of Gold Award.

HEROIC HEART OF GOLD

As a child of the Depression, Robert Extrom never realized his family’s poverty would give him the perseverance, courage, and loyalty he would need in the service of his country.

At 18, when tensions were escalating between North and South Korea, Bob enlisted in the Marine Corps. After completing boot camp at Parris Island, South Carolina, he was trained in radio/communications at Camp Pendleton in California. The Marines’ motto, Semper Fidelis—“Always Faithful”—took root in Bob’s heart when the 1st Marine Division received orders to ship off to Korea for war.

On September 15, 1950, Marine forces landed at the strategic port of Inchon and pushed inland to recapture Seoul. Trudging through rice paddies, Bob detected erratic bubbles in the water and his captain urged him to fall back—the radio equipment on his back was drawing North Korean sniper fire. By November, the 1st Marines were fighting for survival in the Chosin Reservoir, where temperatures dipped to -45°F. The Chinese outnumbered the Marines 8-1, completely surrounding them. During fierce engagement, Bob was blown off his feet by mortar shells, sustaining a concussion and a back injury. Large chunks of shrapnel embedded in his spare battery thus saving his life.

Bob became one of the courageous “Frozen Chosin,” or “The Chosin Few,” who made it out of the Chosin Reservoir alive. For heroically putting himself in harm’s way and persevering to keep lines of communication open, Bob received two combat “V” awards and was later promoted to Staff Sergeant. OOHRAH!!
THE CASHMAN FAMILY

Submitted by Janice Extrom Sheridan

My father (Cletus Cashman) fought in Korea with the 1st Marine Division, 1st Battalion. He received a Purple Heart for being wounded at Bunker Hill. We celebrated his 92nd birthday on February 29, 2020.

Dad married my mom in June of 1956, and they were married 62 years until mom passed a couple of years ago. They had six children. My younger brother passed in 2016. He was also a Marine which my father is very proud of.

Dad everyday puts out his American flag and pulls it back in before dark. I was honored to be able to fly with him for his honor flight to Washington, D.C. It was an amazing day for my dad ... one he will never forget. Neither will I.

My father also has wrote down quite a few war time stories from his time in Korea. A friend of his has made a small book of it. It’s called the Greenest Marine.

He is going strong and says Semper Fi!
By: Matt Segal, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), Cary, NC

I was commissioned in 1971 through Temple University’s ROTC program and went on active duty in 1972 as a 2nd Lieutenant reporting to Ft. Ben Harrison for the Adjutant General Officer Basic Course (AGOBC), followed by six weeks at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) also at Ft. Ben at that time for the Broadcast Officer course. During a career that spanned 28 years retiring as a colonel in 1999, I had many assignments, but most were in branch immaterial slots. So beyond year five, I had few AG assignments, working mostly in Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, or in an IG position.

In 1973, I was the deputy PAO at Ft. Dix and called the AG assignments branch and asked to go on a short tour. Branch told me the only available short tours were to South Korea or Thailand as we were sending no one to Vietnam at that time. I told them I would prefer Thailand ... so a few days later I got orders to Korea! I guess that’s why they call it a dream sheet.

I would be going as the Administrative Officer to Armed Forces Korea Network (AFKN). That was a perfect job for someone with my background, and I got a letter from my sponsor, LTC Myrick, welcoming me. I got off the plane in Korea in September 1973. My name was called out with a bunch of others at Camp Coiner, and I was told we were all going to the 2nd Division! I was told I would be taking command of the 10th Army Postal Unit at Camp Red Cloud. Surprise, surprise.

I had no postal knowledge (obviously I had not attended the course) and here I was as a 2LT commanding a unit that should have been commanded by a Captain, but what does not kill you makes you stronger. Long story short, it was a great assignment as anyone who has done postal knows, because of (among other things) the smiles you see on soldier’s faces when the unit does its job. And I had some great soldiers and in this little unit of less the 20 soldiers. We actually had an 8th Army Soldier of the Quarter who was presented an Army Commendation Medal by the Commander of 8th Army/USFK/UNC, General Stilwell.

In 1973, about 20 years after the Korean War, Korea was still recovering, as you can imagine, but I loved the Korean people. They were resourceful, polite to a fault, and just great to work with. And their soldiers were as tough as they come. I always knew they would become a positive force for good in the world once they recovered from the horrors of the Korean War. Little did I know how significant a force they would become.

Fast forward to 2016. As a member of the 2nd ID Association, I was informed of the Korea Revisit tour program which was conducted a number of times each year primarily in the warmer months. I always wanted to see South Korea again to see how far they had come in the 42 years since I left. Every October, my wife and I attend the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) annual meeting in DC and throughout the meeting, we saw just how far the country had progressed, but I wanted to see it live in the country. The Korea Revisit tour provided that opportunity for my wife and me in July 2016.

My wonderful wife, Meg, and I have been married over 36 years and she has never set foot in Korea but based on the tour structure and all I had told her from my memory, she was on board for the trip. We also added the optional tour to Korean War sites. Our tour had 121 people in it from pay grades E-3 (just got assigned during a 3-year active duty stint) to several retired GOs. We also had people on our tour who had served or were descendants of military personnel who had served in Korea during the Korean War as well as people who had served from other UN countries such as Sweden, Canada, Australia, The Philippines, Colombia, India, South Africa, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, and others.

At our farewell dinner, General Brooks was with us along with CSM Payton. Imagine a large group of young Korean schoolgirls singing “You are My Sunshine” and giving all veterans a red rose and a kiss on the cheek. Imagine being applauded everywhere you went by a thankful group of people, who you never met. The high from the trip just never stopped, and I urge you to take the opportunity to go on this trip. How many of our allies go this far over the top to say thanks?!

When you are a soldier serving overseas you think of yourself as just doing your job. When you see appreciation like this, you know you were not just doing your job, but fulfilling your calling!

As an AG, you are often the person behind the curtain, but nobody comes into the Army or leaves the Army without seeing you first and last respectively. And if they stay in, your fingerprint is on them, even if they do not know it, into the Army or leaves the Army without seeing you first and last respectively.

The South Korean people are really special. If you read Korean history, they have made lemonade out of lemons and not just to their benefit, but to the benefit of the world. That is a legacy that should make us all proud, and I am certainly glad to have been a very small part of it as I was given the honor to serve there.
**NORTH KOREA'S JUNE 25 SURPRISE ATTACK: AN IMPORTANT LESSON IN BATTLE PREPARATION**

By: James Lint, Faculty Member, American Public University System

June 25 is a day that all military planners and intelligence professionals should remember as a lesson in proper battle preparation. On that date in 1950, North Korea surprised the U.S. military with an attack that swept U.S. and South Korean forces into the Pusan Perimeter and almost off the Korean peninsula. Defeat appeared quick and sudden.

It was only nine years after the devastation at Pearl Harbor and no one believed that a surprise attack could happen to U.S. forces ever again. But it did.

For the United States, intelligence focus on a former small Japanese-occupied territory was a low priority. The mistake was missing the buildup of Communist support and the large amount of combat equipment in North Korea compared to South Korea, obvious indicators of battle preparation that we can see in hindsight. Because the U.S. overlooked these signs of impending combat, North Korea’s invasion led to a long, bloody civil war.

**How Did This Surprise Attack Happen?**

There are several reasons why North Korea’s invasion came as a surprise to the U.S. military: The U.S. was a budding world power and had many places to focus. For example, there were Cold War activities in Europe and Africa. The U.S. had a small intelligence force, with the CIA’s founding in September 1947. By 1950, the CIA was still prioritizing areas to watch and spend assets.

- The U.S. had won World War II, creating a sense of false confidence that no country would have the audacity to attack the U.S. America was the strong victor who had beaten the Germans, Italians and Japanese. But the U.S. did not take into account that other countries saw the massive drawdown and shrinkage of our active military after WWII.

- Military and government leaders did not rigorously review intelligence collection management or intelligence collection requirements. The Army was otherwise occupied with disarming former WWII foes. Korea ended the war as occupied Japanese territory and later broke up into North and South Korea. Russia gained influence in North Korea after this division.

- U.S. military and civilian intelligence services were unprepared for an imminent battle. There was a prevailing sense among intelligence leaders that “a new battle cannot happen,” which proved to be wrong. Even during peacetime, it is wise to be aware of potential combat possibilities and probabilities.

**Insufficient Military Forces and Logistics Failure Contributed to U.S. Failure to Anticipate Invasion**

Military planners should remember that the military manning the Korean Peninsula was insufficient to quickly deploy and logistics had degraded. The 1st Marine Division was not fully prepared to deploy from California and newly recruited Marines had to do their training on the ships that conveyed them to the battlefield. Also, combat personnel had inappropriate footwear for the climate; there were stories of people with dress shoes in wintertime combat.

History shows that most drawdowns go too far. Often, enemies see the possibility for them to advance due to a recent drawdown, especially during the early period of a new war.

**Constant Vigilance Against Enemies is Always Vital**

This invasion was also an important lesson to intelligence professionals, especially in the military. They must always be energetic and alert for the next December 7 or June 25.
in the military is not an easy profession. No one hears about the minor successes, but everyone knows mistakes can be costly.

**South Korean Post-War Economy Recovers with U.S. Support**

U.S. troops have been in Korea since 1945, when they accepted the surrender of Japanese troops at the end of WWII. Many people wonder if remaining in Korea is worth it.

Seoul is a noteworthy story of economic recovery and success after a devastating war. It is an economic power and a member of a vibrant, international business community. The American military assisted in that growth by providing military protection and support. Early on, U.S. support fed a starving population in South Korea. Later, the U.S. helped South Korea to create a strong military for defending the country.

American military support, the Peace Corps and foreign aid all built Korea into a strong country that is now a world-recognized economic power. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks South Korea as the 11th most powerful economy in the world.

The United States took over 200 years to get to our strong economic position. Korea did it in 60 years, going from abject poverty to economic strength with U.S. support.

**Strategic Lessons to Be Learned From the Korean War**

We rarely talk about North Korea’s surprise attack at the start of the Korean War. But it is important to remember our failures and avoid repeating our mistakes. We should remember, that in an attack, the enemy has a vote in the outcome of a battle. Adequate battle preparation can be a decisive factor in combat and can defeat unexpected invasions.
THE GEOSTRATEGIC IMPACT OF THE CORONAVIRUS

By: Patrick M. Cronin
Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute

The coronavirus is both a global public health and financial crisis. But it is also a geostrategic challenge to America’s power and influence in the Asia-Pacific and worldwide. Some leading analysts see the coronavirus as a critical global turning point undermining China’s role in leading globalization. In contrast, others see Beijing leveraging the crisis to reshape global order at America’s expense.

The stakes are high, but the judgments may be premature. Even so, without knowing the full impact of the virus, it seems probable that the shock of this pandemic will amplify economic, technological, and security trends already underway.

First, the post-coronavirus environment will fuel rather than defuse US-China geo-economic competition. Although pandemics call for a higher degree of international cooperation, the COVID-19 virus that gripped Wuhan and spread globally is likely to exacerbate the trade war and preexisting tensions between the world’s two largest economies.

A global recession appears to be underway. Certainly, the coronavirus has damaged China’s already slowing economy, which, in the words of one analyst, was already “on a path to long term stagnation.” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will likely put off painful economic reforms and look for short-term stimulus. Xi Jinping will further abandon economic and financial liberalization reforms accompanying the 19th Party Congress. Toxic debt and the misallocation of capital to state-owned enterprises will mount. At the same time, the CCP will need to shift more resources to deal with a brittle public health system and an aging population.

The CCP narrative that suggests authoritarianism is more able to combat a corona crisis than are democratic models of governance too quickly forgets Beijing’s early missteps and fails to appreciate the successes of Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. But the Chinese economy may be among the first to start recovering. Having turned a corner on managing the outbreak of the contagion at home, Beijing is projecting growing optimism, even months in advance of a COVID-19 vaccine.

At the same time, the United States economy is facing hurricane-strength headwinds. Markets have plummeted, and economic activity has ground to a halt as the virus disrupts daily life in America. But talk of depression and 20 percent unemployment seems like a worst-case rather than likely-case prognosis. Russia’s bid to crush America’s shale-oil may fail, but it adds another stress to a key pillar of the US economy. China may take advantage of even relative US weakness or distraction to back-pedal on its agreement to purchase up to $200 billion in additional US goods, including LNG, over the next two years. Meanwhile, as nations turn inward, expect China to fill the void and build out its network of CCP-compliant or US-independent regional and international institutions.

Second, US-China techno-nationalism and protectionism will sharpen. Although there is no consensus over whether and to what extent the
United States and its allies and partners need to decouple from China’s economy, the coronavirus has exposed new vulnerabilities that grow from an over-reliance on an economy managed by the CCP.

The CCP leveraged Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, facial recognition technology, and drones to police its Wuhan crisis. The positive results will only further accelerate Beijing’s plans to advance the surveillance state further. It will also prompt Beijing to double down on investments in Made in China 2025 technologies vital to achieving information superiority and the China Dream. For instance, dominating the global semiconductor chip-making industry appears to be an essential goal.

While countries now realize they are over-dependent on China for the production of critical medical supplies and antibiotics, in the short run, that reliance should be a boost to the Chinese economy. China resulting demands for sustained Chinese growth will ensure that Beijing’s variant of state capitalism will further exploit free-market vulnerabilities through state-backed intellectual property theft, subsidized national champions, and other means. Expect China to deepen investment in the digital technologies that advance both its economic and security interests.

America and core allies like South Korea and Japan need to accelerate plans to disentangle critical technologies and reduce strategic dependencies on China. Other countries will also step up plans to relocate manufacturing and business hubs outside of the Mainland. For the United States, the great disentanglement will take time, leadership, and the ability to mobilize the private sector and coalition partners. One challenge might be called the Microsoft problem. That is, how can a large US company wholly cut itself off from Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese national champions without reducing its market share and thereby starving itself of necessary R&D for future innovation?

The virus is also likely to hasten competition for setting international technology standards. These are rules that should be dominated by the United States, South Korea, and other successful democratic systems, not authoritarian states gaming the international system and the ruleset established for free-market economies.

Third, the coronavirus will create new if different governance challenges for major and middle powers alike. For the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other democracies, the successful management of the twin health and economic crises is a prerequisite to sustaining the power of governing parties. Meanwhile, one-party states are likely to do far better in concealing the existence of new political fissures created by the corona crisis. Authoritarian states incapable of containing potential upheaval at home may be overturned or compelled to resort to disrupting regional order.

China’s initial coverup about the severity of the outbreak, which was known in December but not acted upon until the third week of January, created a moment that appeared to be Xi’s “Chernobyl.” Even then, Beijing slipped up by allowing mass tours to continue during the Lunar New Year holidays, significantly widening the global spread of what the Global Times then referred to as the “Wuhan pneumonia.”

Disparagement of Xi escalated, especially in the wake of revelations regarding the brutal crackdown in Xinjiang, heavy-handedness in Hong Kong, and unrelenting harassment of democratic Taiwan. The persistent criticism of Xi’s early attempts at covering up the scope of the outbreak, and his call for Chinese to follow him in a ‘People’s War’ is instructive of both enduring CCP legitimacy problems and Xi’s preferred theory of victory narrative.

Now the CCP is papering over its initial blunders, exploiting the missteps of others, and hammering home a single-minded narrative that authoritarian China is both benevolent and the best model for dealing with the virus and the world. Beijing loves to trot out its favorite foreign voices to mouth the party line, including the over-the-top notion that China is by far the most advanced nation capable of grappling with the coronavirus.

China, as one Brookings Institution senior fellow noted, appears to be avoiding blame by trolling the world. However, venting and trolling may be better than an insecure Xi leadership looking to shore up his legitimacy by using force on Taiwan or another hotspot.

But a global pandemic and financial crisis offer little room for gamesmanship, even if of the major-power variety. Leadership that mobilizes others around an important common cause will always be more compelling than leadership wasted on lesser pursuits. More about that below, but first, it is necessary to underscore how the coronavirus may produce a leadership challenge in North Korea.

A full-blown health crisis in North Korea could produce unpredictable outcomes for the hereditary Kim dynasty. Just as North Korea’s Sixth Army Corps reportedly mutinied amid the 1996 famine, an overwhelmed public health system could trigger a coup or, even worse, propel Kim Jong Un into initiating a conflict to unify the population behind him. Despite North Korea’s totalitarian regime, even Kim Jong Un has not been able to conceal its vulnerability to COVID-19.

A country that has yet to admit its first official case of the coronavirus, in recent days North Korea has seen Kim and other key officials wearing protective masks in public, UN medical supplies rushed from China, and an announcement that Pyongyang will build the country’s most advanced hospital by October. As ROK-US Combined Forces Command Commander General Robert B. Abrams noted in a press briefing on March 13th, although North Korea “is a closed-off nation,” he was “fairly certain” the Kim regime is suffering from cases of the coronavirus. The secrecy surrounding the Kim regime makes it difficult to anticipate the scope of the crisis. Still, an autocratic leader fearful of his own position could face a sudden regime collapse or seek to forestall failure, either through a diplomatic gambit or a reckless military provocation. Diplomacy, deterrence, and alliance readiness for any contingency are even more salient at a time when minds are so focused on dealing with a pandemic.

Fourth, the current crisis centers on science and technology, especially related to biology and health care. An ongoing Fourth Industrial Revolution focuses heavily on information-based technologies to drive the global economy and security alike. Even so, the criticality of biology
and the health sciences are amply underscored by the coronavirus. Cooperation, and not just competition, must be enhanced to cope with both the current pandemic and those pandemics yet to come.

The United States is now fully mobilized to deal with the coronavirus. But the US government squandered valuable time and failed to fully incorporate the lessons from previous epidemics that would have enabled widespread testing from the outset. Putting the best scientists and science forward is essential. But the geostrategic impact of the coronavirus will eventually transcend the current crisis. As one biotech scientist has noted, “There has been a global wake-up call that biotechnology is a strategic industry for our societies.” A major part of the feverish interest in biotechnology can be a healthy competition to find a vaccine for the coronavirus and other positive medical breakthroughs. But much of this medical research will have to be done in the private sector, at the national level, and with nations with similar protections for IP and safety standards.

In this endeavor, the United States would be wise to work in tandem with other advanced democratic allies. South Korea’s exemplary leadership in advancing coronavirus testing illustrates the obvious value of teamwork. More generally, the aim needs to be helping to solve a common problem, not scapegoating, or playing a pointless blame game. Thus, the United States, South Korea, and others should be engaged in ongoing policy dialogue for understanding best practices and learning lessons for grappling with future pandemics. Perhaps the United States and South Korea, as well as Japan, can rethink alliance burden-sharing in light of the myriad benefits that accrue from shared scientific achievement and advanced research and development.

More pessimistically, it should also be evident that the threats emanating from synthetic biology will multiply. The coronavirus almost surely started in an illegal wet market, not a biology lab. However, the impact of a dangerous new virus could encourage unaccountable authorities to weaponize synthetic biology. A range of future bioterror threats may emerge from clandestine laboratories through the use of CRISPR, DNA printing, and other synthetic biology advances. Revisionist major powers pose the most significant risk. The People’s Liberation Army is being touted in China for developing an early vaccine, a development that at once highlights the promise of synthetic biology but also the potential security risk. The CCP’s technological gains could encourage it to think the unthinkable: namely, how it might—under duress from its perspective—surreptitiously plant a future virus for economic, political, and strategic impact, perhaps amid a crisis or conflict. North Korea may be even less restrained. After all, the Kim regime had no difficulty deploying a VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim Jong-nam.

The geostrategic impact is likely to lag behind the damage done from the health and economic crises. However, over time, these and other developments may well come to redefine the regional and global security landscape.
The outbreak, and Pyongyang’s response, will seriously strain the North Korean economy.

Despite Pyongyang’s efforts to insulate itself from the spread of the coronavirus, North Korea will not be able to insulate its economy from the consequences of the infectious disease.

Cognizant of its vulnerabilities, North Korea was one of the first countries to take steps to stop the spread of the coronavirus known as COVID-19.

Early estimates suggest that the coronavirus could result in a first quarter contraction in Pyongyang’s largest trading partner, China, while the OECD warned that a longer lasting outbreak could cut global growth in half this year. North Korea will also likely face slowing internal economic activity as it loses access to needed external inputs and potential domestic constraints on economic activity.

While exact data for North Korea may not be available, we do know that the North Korean economy has not been able to avoid the economic consequences of the coronavirus. International trade is likely minimal at most, but that decline in trade is likely also filtering through the domestic economy in the form of inflation and reduced supplies of food and raw materials for manufacturing. The economy is also likely facing financial pressures. Ultimately, this is not a situation that Pyongyang can control and its impact on the North Korean economy will likely depend on how long the coronavirus persists and how quickly the economy in China is able to recover.
North Korea continues to deny that it is affected by the coronavirus. Yet all indications are that there is an outbreak in the North, though the extent of it is unknown. Such an outbreak can have severe consequences for South Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and the region that few dare to consider: North Korean internal instability that could lead to regime collapse.

North Korea is the least-equipped country in the world to deal with coronavirus. Last week, at a ground-breaking ceremony for a new Pyongyang General Hospital scheduled for completion by October, Kim Jong Un himself admitted that North Korea lacks modern medical facilities and demanded improvements. Although he did not explicitly mention the coronavirus, Kim is likely wary of its potential impact on his regime.

To be sure, the Kim regime has insisted it has everything under control. To mitigate a potential outbreak, North Korea has tried to close its borders and suspend trade. It has also heavily restricted the domestic movement of its citizens.

But the United Nations, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and other organizations are skeptical. Based on the spread of the virus globally and North Korea’s precarious geographic positioning between South Korea and China, which have both experienced high numbers of coronavirus infections, it is logical to assume the virus has spread there.

General Robert Abrams, the highest ranking U.S. military officer in Korea, stated he is “fairly certain” of a northern outbreak based on reports that the North Korean military was under a 30 day lockdown.

North Korea is woefully unprepared to deal with COVID-19. And that’s a danger to the world. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
Daily NK, a digital news publication organized by North Korean escapees, has reported that as many as 200 North Korean soldiers have died as a result of the virus.

Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, revealed that the North Korean leader had received a letter from President Trump offering help. Similarly, South Korea and the UN have offered support to the Korean people. Yet it is highly unlikely the regime will ask for or accept substantial aid. Concerned more about projecting an image of strength than the welfare of its people, only when catastrophic conditions occur inside North Korea would the regime accept help.

If it ever approved foreign assistance, the regime would likely accept only forms of help it can control: either direct cash payments or food and aid provided directly to the regime. Little or none of it would get to the intended recipients. Unless the regime allows transparency so independent monitors can ensure aid goes to those most in need, the U.S. and the international community should only provide aid with such verification protocols set and ensured as the innocent North Korean people should not suffer for its government’s transgressions. If not, the world risks providing aid that only helps the regime elite without alleviating the suffering of its vulnerable people.

While a pandemic’s direct impact on the lives of the innocent Korean people in the North will be devastating, it is the effect on the military – and consequently on Kim’s decision-making – that creates strategic risks for the U.S./ROK alliance. Failure to curb a widespread epidemic could undermine internal stability, thereby forcing the regime into a crisis decision-making mode. In the short term, Kim would likely engage in provocations to demonstrate that he firmly maintains control. North Korea already conducted three separate short-range missile tests over the first three weeks of March, likely part of the North Korean military’s winter training cycle. Kim in turn may direct continued missile and rocket testing.

Such provocations could lead to miscalculation and escalation on both sides, which could bring devastating consequences. It is also likely that cyber attacks will increase as a means both to steal funds and to create chaos and distraction around the world. Unidentified hackers already attacked the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services with a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack to disrupt Washington’s broader coronavirus response efforts. This fits a pattern of previous North Korean attacks against medical systems.

Additional reports found disinformation being dispersed to sow chaos among the American public. While the U.S. has not attributed this attack to anyone, Washington should be on guard for attacks on public health systems, because even if there is no outbreak in the North, it may seize the current opportunity to employ what Kim has described as its “all-purpose sword” of cyber warfare.

One of the true unknowns is whether the coronavirus crisis will create the conditions for regime collapse. During contingency planning efforts in the 1990s, planners defined collapse as the loss of the ability of the Korean Workers Party to govern the entire territory of the north from Pyongyang, combined with the loss of coherency of the military and of its support for the regime.

Expert analysts studying Korea anticipate a collapse would stir a series of far-reaching catastrophes on the peninsula that has regional if not global repercussions. These may include a humanitarian disaster – far surpassing the Arduous March of the Famine of 1994-1996 (estimated deaths between 600,000 and 1 million) – that could result in massive refugee movements north into China, south across the DMZ into the ROK, and via the East Sea to Japan. The situation would create extreme danger, with the potential loss of control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Competition for resources among military units with no central party control may also lead to conflict over scarce resources, which could escalate into civil war.

There have been predictions over the past three decades that North Korea would experience instability and regime collapse, particularly after the famine in the mid-1990s. However, the regime and the Korean people in the north have proven very resilient. Most importantly, the regime received billions of dollars in aid from South Korea from 1997 through 2007 that not only contributed to its survival but also to the funding of its first nuclear test in 2006. This time may be different. The coronavirus could spread too rapidly and overwhelm the North Korean system, and the regime is unlikely to receive the amount of cash aid it did two decades ago.

All of these scenarios demand that policy makers, strategists, and military planners be on guard for indicators of North Korean instability. They must prepare for the very real possibility that contingency plans may have to be executed by the alliance. The ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command in particular must now review contingency plans for the full range of threats.

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BOOK REVIEW

NORTH KOREA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: ENTERING A NEW ERA OF DETERRENCE

By Sung Chull Kim, PhD & Michael D. Cohen, PhD
Reviewed by Schuyler C. Webb, PhD, Celestar Corporation, USFK

North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering a New Era of Deterrence (2017) may have been an overlooked harbinger of the current nuclearization status on the Korean Peninsula. In the same year the book was published, North Korea was precariously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking the United States and its East Asian allies. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect the required delivery systems. Nonetheless, Kim Jong-un’s regime appeared to be close. Ostensibly, the intelligence reports were correct. As of 2017, North Korea has successfully launched a number of test ICBMs that have the capability of striking the continental United States and its allies -- South Korea and Japan. It can be inferred from the book that since North Korean missiles can target the continental United States, it will likely take larger risks than it has to date. It may undertake such limited-war actions as much to achieve political gains as military ones.

The editor, Sung Chull Kim, and a host of expert contributors including Michael D. Cohen contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is “past the point of no return.” They posit that geopolitical scholars and military policymakers must focus their attention on how to deter a nuclearized North Korea (i.e., the complete elimination of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, their means of production, and their means of delivery). In general, the contributors hold that the United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact that North Korea will be able to deter them with its burgeoning nuclear arsenal.

The international group of authors in this work offered insightful analyses of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability impacting international security. Moreover, they addressed salient questions such as “How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea develops the capability to strike medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons?” “How will and should the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China respond?” “What will this mean for regional stability in the short- and long-term?” Their responses and essays were not only timely, but also were predictive of the current state of affairs. Consequently, the KDVA community and its supporters will appreciate the book’s compelling empirical and detailed analyses as well as explanations of the recent past and what can be expected by the complexities and threat of North Korea nuclearization.

Readers will note that the editors and contributors’ diverse, international perspectives complement each other in the in-depth scholarship and interdisciplinary nature of the book.

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Sung Chull Kim, PhD, is Humanities Korea Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. He is also the editor of the Asian Journal of Peacebuilding and the author or editor of a number of books including North Korea under Kim Jong II: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance (2006), Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative (2010), State Violence in East Asia (2012), and Partnership with Hierarchy: The Evolving East Asian Security Triangle (2017).

Michael D. Cohen, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. His research has been published in various journals such as The Journal of Global Security Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and The Non-Proliferation Review.
Research Review
NUCLEAR DEBATES AND POLITICAL COMPETITION IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN:
DENUCLEARIZATION OR NUCLEAR LATENCY IN THE AFTERMATH OF FUKUSIMA

By: Alex Chang Lee, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, University of California, Irvine, 2019
Summarized and edited by Schuyler C. Webb, PhD, Celestar Corporation, USFK

The objective of this research was primarily analytical, aiming at a better understanding of why Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are experiencing different outcomes in their nuclear decisions in the post-Fukushima era. It explores how these devianting outcomes will influence these states’ non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years. To date, much of the scholarship on nonproliferation in Northeast Asia has paid inadequate attention to the effect of political segmentation and competition within the nuclear policy arena on nuclear decision-making processes and nuclear policies. As Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan democratized and liberalized, the political segmentation within the nuclear policy arena diversified into multiple domestic coalitions with different agendas. Thus, political competition within the nuclear policy arena became more complicated as various local coalitions interacted and competed for political influence. The questions driving the research were:

- What determines the nuclear orientation of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the aftermath of Fukushima?
- Why are these three states experiencing different outcomes in the post-Fukushima era?
- What is the likelihood that these states will reverse their non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years?

The research argues that in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the segmentation and rearrangement of political competition within the nuclear policy arenas of these states are the main factors in determining these states’ nuclear orientations. Nuclear orientation is operationalized via the political behavior of domestic nuclear coalitions, which include coalitions that are pro-nuclear energy, pro-nuclear weapons, anti-nuclear energy, and anti-nuclear weapons. Thus, this dissertation contends that in the post-Fukushima era, the final nuclear decision-making of these states is determined by the interplay of these four domestic coalitions within the nuclear policy arena. It is also determined by how the international and local conditions of economy, safety, security, and social norms are filtered through the lenses of these four coalitions. The controlled comparison of these three states in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident provides important benefits for improving our systematic understanding of the relationship between the interplay of coalitions and the nuclear orientation of states.

In the post-Fukushima era, changing international and domestic conditions filtered through the lenses of domestic coalitions affected their nuclear weapons debates differently and resulted in various decision outcomes. These states have been very adamant about their non-nuclear weapons policies while heavily condemning North Korea. As North Korea continued to conduct its nuclear tests, a domino effect or “reactive proliferation,” as many experts predicted, did not occur in Northeast Asia. However, there are still some possibilities that reactive proliferation could occur in Northeast Asia and spill over to other regions if any one of these states decides to nuclearize in the future. Taiwan is moving toward complete denuclearization by removing its civilian nuclear programs. South Korea is gradually moving toward complete denuclearization via a gradual phase-out of its nuclear power and finding different paths to complete its nuclear fuel cycle.

However, Japan’s nuclear orientation is circling back to the original position that it had prior to the Fukushima incident. According to the findings of the case study chapters, this dissertation cautiously envisions that, for different domestic political reasons, Japan and South Korea are more prone to nuclearize than Taiwan if the U.S. nuclear umbrella fails to work properly in the coming years. Japan has an ambition to become the powerhouse of Asia once more. Thus, nuclear weapons might not be an end-goal but a necessary step on its way to becoming a great power. This study contends that Japan is more prone to produce nuclear weapons due to its political motivations and the consistency shown by its leadership on the matter of nuclear hedging throughout the years. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Japanese leadership continuously used external threats, such as China and North Korea, to rouse nationalistic sentiment within the general population and to justify its remilitarization process. In particular, the surge of nationalism in Japan should be carefully monitored because this will not influence its short-term, but will influence its long-term, national strategy.

In contrast, the study contends that South Korea is prone to produce nuclear weapons due to high public support. Even though public support for nuclear weapons is showing a pattern of downward trend since 1999, the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons is still popular among many South Koreans. As North Korea continued to conduct its nuclear tests, a domino effect or “reactive proliferation,” policies while heavily condemning North Korea. These states have been very adamant about their non-nuclear weapons policies while heavily condemning North Korea. As North Korea continued to conduct its nuclear tests, a domino effect or “reactive proliferation,” as many experts predicted, did not occur in Northeast Asia. However, there are still some possibilities that reactive proliferation could occur in Northeast Asia and spill over to other regions if any one of these states decides to nuclearize in the future. Taiwan is moving toward complete denuclearization by removing its civilian nuclear programs. South Korea is gradually moving toward complete denuclearization via a gradual phase-out of its nuclear power and finding different paths to complete its nuclear fuel cycle.

Thus, even though there are no immediate concerns for these states to abandon their non-nuclear weapons policies, the international community needs to monitor the public support for the nuclear weapons in South Korea and the surge of nationalism and the current remilitarization process in Japan.

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Thus, even though there are no immediate concerns for these states to abandon their non-nuclear weapons policies, the international community needs to monitor the public support for the nuclear weapons in South Korea and the surge of nationalism and the current remilitarization process in Japan.
When military tension rises on the Korean peninsula, the world sees its impacts. Stock markets go down; journalists churn out headlines; and important political meetings are called to come up with countermeasures.

As these tensions develop, the international community often gets perplexed at the calmness of the South Korean people in a tense situation that can at any point develop into a full-blown war. When North Korea, for example, threatens to “obliterate Seoul into a sea of fire,” Seoul citizens do not seem much disturbed and go about their lives calmly.

A few theories on this overarching sense of complacency among South Koreans have been put forward. One of these theories is the South Koreans’ strong trust in the Alliance. Many South Koreans doubt that North Korea would ever attempt to launch a real attack for fear of overwhelming counterattacks by the Alliance.

Another theory relates to the attribution theory in psychology. It argues that when a person in a hopeless situation beyond his/her control (an uncontrollable and external factor), his/her motivation to achieve desired results decreases. It can be clarified under this hypothesis that there is only so much ordinary citizens of South Korea can do in the midst of conflicts, so they just go about their business as usual.

Others justify it by saying that North Korea has cried wolf too many times. South Koreans are now dismissing North Korea’s war of words as mere empty threats. This sense of complacency is reinforced by a herd mentality, which makes people underestimate a risk because other people seem to do the same.

Despite rare few overt confrontations that North Korea has provoked in the past, it is safe to say that South Koreans have remained calm relative to the actual magnitude of threats and conflicts. Nonetheless, this feeling of complacency among South Koreans shows sign of disappearing as China continues to grow its sphere of influences. China’s aggressive rise poses a threat to South Korea’s ordinary citizens mostly on two fronts: economic and public health.

Ironically, the view of South Koreans towards China, at least five years ago, was not nearly as negative as it is now. For example, 60% of South Koreans expressed a favorable opinion of China in a 2015 Pew Research survey. There were several factors at play here: the expansion of Korean-Sino trade, a set of pro-Chinese policies under the former Park Administration, and cultural exchanges.

South Korea’s amicability towards China ended abruptly when Beijing imposed a set of de facto economic retaliations against Seoul for its 2016 decision to introduce the THAAD counter-missile system. Although the use of the issue linkage tactic (a negotiation strategy used to tackle multiple issues simultaneously) is not a novelty in international affairs, the scale of China’s economical-political linkage and its rapid implementation were excessive enough to lose the hearts and minds of many Koreans.

For the first time since South Korea had reaped massive economic benefits from its trade with China, South Koreans saw firsthand that their close economic ties worked as a double-edged sword when it came to issues of national security. Many successful Korean businesses that had entered the Chinese market had to sustain massive operating losses and pull their business out of the country. Domestically, a wide range of sectors that depended on Chinese inboungs took the hit as well. Many employees lost their jobs, and families had to endure a series of economic struggles. People began to raise concerns about South Korea’s heavy dependence
on China for the stability of their economy and called for diversifying their trade relations.

China’s 2016 economic retaliation served as the first wake-up call to the sense of complacency in South Korea. Unlike North Korea, China is a strong economy, and can easily throw its economic weight around to influence South Korea’s decision-making process about security. Unlike threats from North Korea, which ordinary South Korean people do not feel directly, China’s economic retaliations were noticeable, and many Koreans themselves took the brunt and felt the impact.

The second wake-up call regards public health concerns. Many South Koreans believe that China is the major culprit behind increasing levels of fine dust in their country. There is no conclusive evidence on this yet, but what matters for foreign policymakers is that the Korean public now perceives China as a grave threat to their public health.

In the minds of the Korean people, economic expansion in China equals more factories along the Eastern Chinese coast, which translate into more pollution in the air that they breathe. Wearing a face mask to protect against fine dust pollution is the new norm when people go out in Korea. Going out for a picnic should be carefully planned to avoid days with high levels of fine dust. Ordinary people in South Korea are now seeing firsthand the way their daily life is being threatened by China.

Another layer to this problem is the spread of COVID-19. Aside from the fact that the virus stems from China, the totalitarian approach China is taking to contain the outbreak gives chills to many Koreans. China’s systematic suppression and censorship of media reports on the virus, for instance, raise serious concerns to many South Koreans as such oppression fundamentally differs from the democratic principles of South Korea.

Also, South Koreans know that silencing truth-tellers in the battle against the virus would eventually prove counter-effective in the long run. When the news broke out that Chinese censors had hushed up ophthalmologist Li Wenliang’s early warnings of the virus last year and even punished him later, many Koreans worried about further cover-ups by the authoritarian one-party state, which may lead to prolonged periods of the virus. Many experts’ warning that COVID-19 might develop into a seasonal disease that comes and goes every year also adds to their concerns.

South Korean’s grim outlook calls for a stronger Alliance with the U.S. Just like the Alliance successfully deterred North Korean threats, an ironclad Alliance would effectively deter unorthodox types of threats that China presents to South Korea’s public health and economy.

At last year’s first Former Combined Forces Command (CFC) Commander and Deputy Commander Forum in Seoul, the ROK’s former Army Chief of Staff, retired General Kwon, Oh-sung, said that “in our history, no alliance has ever benefited the Korean people more than the ROK-U.S. Alliance.” This cannot be any truer and will remain at the forefront of discussions when South Korea addresses its security concerns about China.
TRIANGULAR COMMUNICATION: DPRK-ROK-U.S.

By: Nicole C. Ruiz, KDVA Intern

The introduction of a free trade deal in 2012 between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (U.S.) further cemented the alliance between the two countries. This economic alliance also expanded the relationship, which had been predominantly security-based over the decades following the Korean War. Although the formal U.S.-ROK Alliance is defined by security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the overall relationship between South Korea and the United States is multidimensional. Even if this is the case, the lack of a proper peace treaty between the two Koreas and the pursuit of nuclear weapons by North Korea (DPRK) emphasize the military and security elements of the alliance. The purpose of this article is to briefly explore the impact that inter-Korean relations have on the U.S.-ROK Alliance, while also acknowledging the effects of the U.S.-DPRK relationship. This article will focus primarily on the early 2000s to the present, because events during this timeframe have shaped the current security environment on the Peninsula.

Before analyzing the effect of inter-Korean relations, it is necessary to understand the nature of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the triangular relationship between all three relevant countries.

Recent history of security on the Korean Peninsula has been shaped by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Although the U.S.-DPRK nuclear negotiations from 1994 were an attempt to reconcile differences, they ultimately broke down in 2002, each side claiming the other had violated the agreements. North Korea’s withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 raised tension on the Peninsula. Leaving the NPT sparked the resumption of six-party talks among Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States which were meant to foster open dialogue regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. These talks should have been able to create a sense of balance since China and Russia, both members of the UN Security Council and nuclear powers themselves, are typically allied with North Korea. Another attempt to reestablish some kind of U.S.-DPRK agreement was made during the six-party talks in 2008. However, North Korea ultimately withdrew from the talks in 2009.

Since the early 2000s, South Korea and North Korea have met on several occasions to discuss the tensions between the two countries, culminating in the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace in 2018. This declaration between South Korea and North Korea is probably the closest the Peninsula has gotten to reconciliation after the war. Earlier in 2018 at South Korea’s PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the two nations marched under the same flag and U.S.-ROK military exercises, which were supposed to take place during the Games, were postponed. The meetings between the leaders of North Korea and the U.S. in the past two years are also promising in the sense that these meetings have opened a new line of potential discourse.

Moving forward, it seems that clearer lines of communication could serve as the foundation of reaching the objective of a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula.
Every time USFK is on the news, my mother rarely goes without mentioning two U.S. soldiers—former PFC Duggins and former PVT Bankston. For her, the content that is being covered in news bears little to no significance…what she cares about is if it features American men and women serving in uniform in South Korea. She often says of her childhood memories, for example, ‘Ah, how sweet they were with their sweet little treats.’

This article is about how, for some South Koreans like me and my mother, support for the Alliance is not rooted in political orientation or evaluation of current affairs, but in something more intimate—relationships, memories, and friendship.

Though it is hard for me to imagine, my 60-year-old mother was once just a little girl in the 1970s. South Korea at the time was entering a transformative period from a war- and poverty-stricken state to a strong manufacturing economy. Despite remarkable economic progress made in those earlier days, the trickle-down effects had not yet been widely disseminated, thus a large proportion of Korean families was still left with persistent economic struggles. My mother was born into one such Korean family.

‘Back in those days,’ my mother recalled, ‘American soldiers would hand out presents to kids in the street, you know, as an act of goodwill and celebration of Christmas.’ She continued telling me a story that made me look at her differently: I saw her for the first time not as just my mother, whose role is to give unconditional love and support. I saw her as the same vulnerable human being whose life was filled with all sorts of bittersweet memories.

The story she told me was about American soldiers’ Christmas handouts. This story takes place when my mother was seven years old in the 1970s. Christmas was around the corner and the neighborhood kids were getting excited; they knew that the American soldiers would come around for special Christmas giveaways.

Among those special giveaways was a bar of chewing gum. At the time, chewing gum was so rare and precious that many people would often re-chew more than once and glue it to a wall of their room to save it for later.

The kind of chewing gum that those good-willed American soldiers had prepared was even more special: it was colored chewing gum. My mother, who had not even seen or had it before, was amped with excitement for that unique treat. She was determined to join a flock of her friends and chant in the streets that magic phrase ‘Gimme a Chocolate’ to get that uniquely colored gum and an magical experience.

Then D-day came, she was at home, determinedly standing by and waiting for that chanting mission. Just as she was about to embark on her mission, her uptight and rigid father came back home, heard about her plans and gave it a firm no-go. He did not take too kindly to her idea of ‘going out and begging around.’ He apparently found it ‘demeaning’ for his little girl to dog strangers in the street and beg for treats.

While her friends were out and beamed at that vividly colored treat that landed in their hands, my mother had to stay home the whole day, empty handed. Brokenhearted and filled with envy, she took out a box of crayons and colored one of the gums that was glued to the wall of her room. She made it look like a piece that her friends got from those good-willed American soldiers. She recalled smilingly, ‘Now I understand your grandfather and I think he did the right thing as a parent, but it took a while for that little girl to grow out of that memory.’

Fast forward to 2012, I was serving as a KATUSA in Camp Casey in Dongducheon. There I became close with Duggins and Bankston, who were, respectively, serving as an assistant to a battalion chaplain and an S1 clerk. One day near Christmas, they came into my room and handed me this nicely-wrapped gift. Inside that box, they said, was a bar of chewing gum; it was for my mother. I must have told them her story in passing before. They remembered it and gave me the chewing gum for her. Inside the box, they even put a picture of themselves holding the gum, with merry twinkles in their eyes.

When I passed the gift onto my mother and she opened it, she flashed a dazzling smile, which was followed by tears of joy and gratefulness. For the first time in my life, she stopped being my guardian, caretaker, and parent; at that moment, she was just the same human being, who bears all sorts of scars in life that can be healed with love and friendship.

A simple act of kindness at times ripples across people’s lives and perspectives. When I contacted Duggins and Bankston for this article, neither of them even remembered this story at first. For them, this story must have been just one of many acts of kindness that they extended to many others.

For me and my mother, however, their sweet little gift is one of the first things that come to mind when we hear the word
Alliance. For us, the word carries a sense of kindness, goodwill, and friendship. It is something cordial and intimate. Through the Alliance, I got to meet Duggins and Bankston; through them my mother and I have become strong supporters of the Alliance. This is the ripple effect of their simple act of kindness. With all my heart, I express my gratefulness and wish for their happiness. May the Alliance remain strong, nurture more friendships, and spread more kindness.

People are always very interested in the "Hermit Kingdom," as Korea was called when Europeans first came to notice it, and as North Korea is sometimes called. With government restrictions on what information gets out, trying to understand the thoughts and lives of regular North Koreans is a difficult prospect. There are defector accounts, of course, but defectors do not necessarily constitute a random sampling of people. There are the North Korean news outlets, but they only say what the regime wants them to say. Finally, there are research papers and other analyses by experts on North Korea, but many times, those aren't firsthand accounts. That’s why I believe reading literature published by North Koreans is the first step towards understanding their mindset. While not being an objective account, fiction has been used since time immemorial to describe and explain the reality experienced by the authors.

First, I’d like to talk about a book written by a North Korean living under the regime that did not undergo censorship. Bandi’s The Accusation is a gift. Written over a period of years, Bandi’s work was smuggled out by a relative who came to South Korea. Originally published in Korean in 2014, this book is unique because it is the only non-government authorized work we have that was written by a North Korean who still lives in North Korea. It is a collection of short stories. The editors believe the first story...
was written in 1989, and the final story was written in 1995.

What kind of North Korea do these stories show us? They, like numerous other accounts, paint a picture of a restricted life where any misstep leads to punishment and where one must never be truthful with one’s feelings. In a story about a woman living in Pyongyang whose son is scared of the portraits of ‘The Dear Leader’, Bandi writes that “[f]ear [is] something which had to be instilled in you from birth if you were to survive life in this country.” (59) While there are some positive things mentioned, such as in the story where Kim Il Sung picks up an old woman on the side of the road and gives her a ride, or the hard work and sacrifice of a wife who chooses to marry a person with lower status than her, in the end, the good is swallowed up by the bad. The old woman was only walking because Kim Il Sung’s traveling party had closed both the railroad and the road, and the wife can do nothing to change her husband’s status and so they choose to defect “[b]ecause we feel that to slide into oblivion would genuinely be better than continuing to live as we have been, persecuted and tormented.” (34) The only good things that remain uncorrupted is the land itself. Like many people, Bandi appears to be attached to the mountains, rivers, trees, and animals that make up his home country.

Defectors, on the other hand, have one more thing to miss: people. In “I Want to Call Her Mother Again,” Park Gui-ok describes how his mother left him and his younger brother in a field, saying that she couldn’t take care of them anymore. However, even after thirteen years (five in China and eight in South Korea), Mr. Park cannot forget her. Looking back through the eyes of an adult, he can see the hard decision she made and tells her, “If you had to abandon your children to save yourself, then you must live to see a hundred. You must live long enough for your abandoned son to return home to you. Because I cannot erase you from my heart no matter how hard I try.” North Korea is a land that forces its people to make hard choices, even those that go against their nature, to survive.

Of course, those choices do not merely affect those that choose. The consequences are also shared with the people around them. Sometimes people force themselves to turn into what the state wants, but because they want better for their families. Gwak Moon-An tells the story of Kim Chul in “The Poet Who Asked for Forgiveness.” Kim Chul was a propaganda writer who was sentenced to a life of hard labor for two things: writing “artistic” and not “political” poetry, and having a relationship with a Russian woman. His young son was also sent with him. Seeing his son grow up working in the mines made him decide that belonging to the Party was vital, and he sent a letter of apology.

At first, it didn’t make any difference. Then Kim wrote a poem called, “Forgive Me.” In it, he begs forgiveness from many people, but not the instrument of his imprisonment:

Do not forgive me, my homeland
If, in the decisive moment of battle

I stop to consider my life
And the enemy’s bullet destined for me
Rips through my comrade
Do not forgive me

It was because of this poem that Kim Jong-II let Kim Chul come back to Pyongyang and begin producing poetry again. Kim Chul ended up writing a poem called “Mother” which Mr. Gwak says all North Koreans are required to learn. Kim Chul likens the Worker’s Party to a mother and expresses willingness to do anything for it, stating:

I will give everything
I will not hesitate
If I could shine one more ray of light
Onto your dignified and solemn countenance

I would become a hot coal
And fuel a power plant

If your endless benevolence
Will turn green those furrows
I shall become a handful of fertilizer
And fatten a stalk of rice.

What more could I want?

While it is certainly possible that Kim Chul himself believes in socialism, the importance of the state, and the value of the community over the individual, it is also possible to interpret his life as a case of evolution in the face of being broken by the system.

Works by Bandi, by defectors, and by Party propaganda writers show us that North Korea is complicated. Bandi writes satirical works criticizing the regime, yet he has chosen to stay in his homeland. Defectors have chosen to leave, but some long to see the people and places they left behind. Propaganda writers beg the question, “How much of what North Korean people are taught to believe is actually believed by them?”

It is important to separate the North Korean regime from the North Korean people. While the ROK-U.S. Alliance is focused on protecting South Korea from aggression by North Korea, that does not mean all North Koreans are the enemy. There are those who also wish to see the end of the oppression of the North Korean people and the promotion of freedom throughout the Peninsula. Indeed, I believe Bandi expresses a democratic sentiment when he says, “A sincere, genuine life is only possible for those who have freedom.” (174) We can only hope that someday, North Koreans will also be able to lead sincere, genuine lives free from oppression.


All other quotes come from the Words Without Borders online magazine, May 2013 edition. https://www.wordswithoutborders.org/issue/may-2013
From the outside, the brown-brick, 19th-century Victorian-style building located on Logan Circle in Washington, D.C. does not seem especially interesting. However, upon entering the house, visitors encounter an entirely different story. Originally the home of U.S. naval officer, U.S. Civil War hero, and diplomat, Seth L. Phelps, the building later served as the cradle of Korean-U.S. friendship -- the Korean Legation -- from 1889 to 1905.

The Joseon Dynasty (1392–1897) and the United States began a diplomatic relationship by signing the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation in May 1882. The treaty marked Korea's first with a Western country as well as the beginning of 138 years of Korean-U.S. alliance. The following year, the United States established Lucius H. Foote as the first U.S. minister to Korea, and shortly after, the U.S. Legation was established in Seoul (Photo 1). Today, the original U.S. Legation building still stands inside the residence of the U.S. ambassador to South Korea -- the Habib House -- in Jongno-gu, Seoul.

Instead of establishing the Korean Legation in the United States in 1883, King Gojong appointed Min Yong Ik as minister plenipotentiary and dispatched bobingsa, the first official Korean delegates, to the United States in 1883 (Photo 2).

After meeting President Chester A. Arthur and delivering King Gojong’s letter and credentials, the bobingsa spent nearly 40 days in the United States. During that time, they visited various industrial sites, modern facilities, cultural institutions, and government organizations, all to learn how Koreans might adapt modern U.S. technology and institutions to Korea in a bid to develop the country.

Five years after the bobingsa visited the United States, King Gojong sent the first Korean minister, Pak, Chung Yang, to Washington, D.C., and established the first Korean Legation in 1888 (Photo 3). Hosted at the Fisher House, a mere half-mile from the White House, the inauguration of the Korean Legation in the United States symbolized the sovereignty of Joseon Korea as a world state.
A year later, the Korean Legation was moved to its present building in Logan Circle, which provided the backdrop for the active diplomatic endeavors of the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1897) and Korean Empire (1897–1910) for 16 years (Photo 4).

The Korean Legation building was lost after being forcibly taken by the Japanese government in 1910. Not only the cradle of Korean-U.S. friendship, borne out of the dedicated diplomatic efforts of Kong Gojong, the building is also a symbol of the drive for independence among Korean residents in the United States during the Japanese occupation of Korea. The legation building itself is a meaningful space that has witnessed major events in both Korean and U.S. history.

With the huge effort of Korean residents in the United States and the Korean government, the Korean Legation building was finally returned to Korea in 2012 (Photo 5 and 6).

As the only historical building of any foreign legation that retains the 19th century archetype of Washington D.C. today, the Korean Legation building now serves as a museum, educating visitors about the Korean-U.S. diplomatic relationship and also the history of American architecture and U.S. foreign diplomacy in 19th century. The Korean Legation building is significant to both countries. It is the center of the Korean-U.S. alliance since 1888 as well as a common cultural heritage that will keep passing on its values to future generations.
In a time when adversity is challenging the world we live in, I am reminded of the things that matter most in my life: family, friends, technology, and my faith. I am a junior at Penn State, and I received news in the middle of March that the rest of the spring semester will be online via video chat. Now, there is a reason as to why I chose to attend physical classes at a physical school: I am someone who has trouble focusing and learning through a screen – especially during a time such as now when I am taking classes heavily focused on my Education and English majors. However, I am thankful that I am fortunate enough to have a permanent address to return to where I am surrounded by people who love me and are supporting me through this difficult transition.

Going to school while at home is a challenge. Being at home with my family in Virginia is tricking my brain into thinking I am on vacation since I usually visit my family on long weekends or school breaks; therefore, my motivation for accomplishing anything productive has been very low. I also do not have my own room in my parents' house to isolate myself in to get my work done, and because of the coronavirus craze, going to a cafe or the neighborhood library is not the smartest thing to do. However, I am again reminded of how fortunate I am to be able to continue my education in a safe haven when others can be in much more difficult situations. I have reliable Wi-Fi, a working laptop, and an abundance of resources through my family and professors who are all trying to ease some of the stress I am experiencing. In more ways than one, my current situation could be much, much worse.

While making sure my family and I are all healthy and safe, the coronavirus has (in a way) forced me to check up on friends I have not talked to in months. I have had the chance to catch up with most of my friends from high school (I graduated in 2017 as one of the last classes from Seoul American High School on Yongsan). I have learned how much they have changed in the past three years. These are people whom I know I can always turn to whenever I want or need to, and they are people who feel the same way about me – thankfully, they are all safe and healthy.

Some days I wish I was 'quarantined' in Korea, since I consider it my home and feel more at place there than in Virginia, where my family currently lives. I feel as though wandering the Yongsan base would be more entertaining than roaming the neighborhood I currently live in since it is bigger and more convenient to access by foot. It might also be easier to contain people since there is already a clear separation by the walls that make up the base. However, I feel fortunate that we (my grandparents live with us) are living in the suburbs because I feel cities are more congested and might present a greater risk of being exposed to the virus. I miss Korea every day, and I know my younger siblings do, as well, since we all grew up there.

One thing about living in Korea that I miss is that everyone looked like me. Here in the United States, some people cannot tell that I am Korean-American and assume I am an international student. Although I have not experienced any first-hand situations where people purposely avoided me because of the way I look in this age of the coronavirus, my aunt had someone rudely avoid her on the DC Metro after realizing she was Asian! The President of the United States even calls the coronavirus the ‘Chinese Virus,’ instigating people to incorrectly -- think this virus belongs to China and is China’s fault.

Finally, through these tough times, I give all glory to God for helping me stay (somewhat) sane. The virus is real and scary and deadly, but I am lucky that no one in my life has been infected, and I pray that my life stays that way. For those affected by the virus on any level deeper than mine, I also pray that God heals them and reminds them that He has a plan for everyone.
The Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundation is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization entrusted with the responsibility to ensure the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., will be maintained in perpetuity. The Memorial honors the sacrifices of the 5.8 million Americans who served in the U.S. armed services during the duration of the Korean War.

In October 2016, legislation was passed and tasked the Foundation with raising the funds necessary to build and establish a Wall of Remembrance to be incorporated with the existing Korean War Veterans Memorial. The Wall of Remembrance will become the permanent home to the names of the 36,574 American service members and over 8,000 Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) who gave their lives defending the people of South Korea from aggression and ensuring their freedom.

The projected construction costs to build the Wall of Remembrance is $31 million and financial support is dependent upon private donations from individual donors and major corporations from around the world. The overall success of this project will focus on creating a detailed and highly disciplined approach to the management of significant donor prospects. This momentous endeavor to build the Wall of Remembrance will ensure the brave U.S. military personnel and members of the South Korean military, who served in South Korean and American units during the war, will be remembered for generations. It will also serve to educate about the cost of freedom to the Memorial's four million visitors each year.

The current Memorial has a column of 19 stainless steel sculptures representing the totality of American Soldiery (Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard) for those who served in the war and defended South Korea.

The current Mural Wall, created by muralist, Louis Nelson, characterizes...
“America’s Mantelpiece,” with over 2,700 actual images of men and women who served during the Korean War. As the 38 statues of American soldiers on patrol are reflected in the Mural Wall, their numbers grow by 38, symbolic of the 38th Parallel, along which the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea was established in 1953. On the Mural Wall is etched the inscription "FREEDOM IS NOT FREE." The addition of the Wall of Remembrance will define the cost of FREEDOM with each individual name of those who gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to FREEDOM.

We cannot do this without your help! Please help us to raise the necessary funding to build the Wall of Remembrance for our fallen soldiers and support the Foundation’s goals. Your financial support is greatly appreciated.

You may visit www.koreanwarvetsmemorial.org to submit your secure online donation or if you prefer, checks can be mailed to:

The Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundation
950 North Washington Street, Suite 311
Alexandria, VA 22314

As we approach the 70th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, it is now the time to remember. If not now, when?

Our nation has a responsibility to make sure we do not forget our men and women in the military who sacrificed to defend the freedoms we enjoy.
Many of you have been in Washington, DC at 17th Street and Constitution Avenue near the White House, in President’s Park. Near that intersection is the iconic U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division Memorial. You have probably seen the Flaming Sword which is the highlight of the memorial. This memorial is dedicated to the fallen soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division during World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. It was first erected in 1936 and later modified in 1962 to include the Korean War.

The memorial was designed by renowned sculptor James Earle Fraser and notable architect John Russell Pope and consists of a monumental tripartite granite wall with a rectangular opening that frames the central focal element: the flaming sword, an 18-foot-high gilded bronze sculpture of a hand grasping a flaming sword designed by Fraser. The hilt of the sword is decorated with the insignia of the 2nd Division, which features a head of a Native American chief on a star.

**Project Development**

In 2014, the Second Indianhead Division Association (2IDA) Memorials Foundation approached the National Park Service to seek approval to make minor modifications to honor the fallen soldiers of the Korean DMZ, Iraq, and Afghanistan. One of the duties of the Park Service is to protect and preserve the treasured memorials in our country and in that vein concluded that without a change in the law, modifications were not possible. The Alaska Congressional Delegation, Senators Murkowski and Sullivan, and Congressman Don Young, all supported our project and over a period of years, were successful in crafting legislation to authorize our modifications.

Congressional approval came early in 2018. The 2IDA Memorial Foundation Trustees worked with a contractor throughout 2019, to develop design options and seek approval from various agencies that oversee such projects. On October 24, 2019, we received design approval from the National Park Service, the Commission of Fine Arts, and the National Capitol Planning Commission. We are at the beginning of construction drawings preparation to give us a good estimate of the cost of the project.
This project proposes to modify one of the most prestigious memorials in our nation’s capital. With that in mind, the modifications will follow the previous expansion on the memorial by adding large rectangular granite stones with space for engravings to honor the veterans of the 2ID Korean DMZ Cold War from 1965 to 1991, the Iraq veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 to 2010, and the Afghanistan veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom from 2009 to 2013.

Design Concepts
The preferred design option maintains the design integrity of the memorial by emphasizing the three zones. However, the central part of the platform is extended and distinguished by two stone plinths aligned with the point where the wing walls meet the central tripartite panel. The height of the plinth matches the wing walls without the coping stone. This option maintains the hierarchy as established in the existing memorial, provides more surface area for inscriptions, and meets the full purpose and need of the project by extending the platform of the memorial, creating a welcoming space for visitors and an enlarged space to accommodate public ceremonies. In addition, this option will provide an opportunity to make the memorial accessible for all visitors, with walkways and an entrance to the Memorial.

The architectural granite panels feature wreaths carved in relief and engraved V-cut recessed inscriptions filled with gold leaf listing the battles fought by the 2nd Division. The memorial is elevated on a granite platform three steps above grade.

The pink granite walls and platform of the memorial create three distinct zones. The central zone is defined by the monumental tripartite granite panels that frame the sword and commemorate lives lost in World War I. The east and west zones are defined by the granite wing walls that commemorate lives lost in World War II (on the west wall) and the Korean War (on the east wall). The wing walls express a welcoming gesture and are punctuated by end granite pedestals with flagpoles. The memorial will not include names of individuals.

There is no better place to announce this very special project than in this KDVA Journal. The project is important to the members and supporters of the Korea Defense Veterans Association (KDVA). All KDVA members as well as the members of the Second Indianhead Division Association have a special interest in honoring the Cold War Korea Defense soldiers. Our memberships overlap and we all share a desire to give proper attention to the soldiers that gave their lives in protecting Freedom’s Frontier.

The 2nd Infantry Division is 103 years old after being formed in France in 1917. The 2ID spent four years in Korea during the Korean War and suffered more killed in action than any other unit or organization by a
factor of two. The 2ID left the Korean Peninsula in 1954 for a short period but returned to the Peninsula in 1965 to assume responsibility for the defense of a portion of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). As we tally up the years, the 2ID has spent more than half of its existence, 59 years, serving in the Republic of Korea. It has been our honor to stand guard with other Korea Defense Veterans to watch the Korean economy grow to the powerhouse it is today, and to continue to serve side-by-side as allies and friends in the ROK-U.S. Combined Division.

The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is strong. We have shown the world that two nations can work together for the benefit of both nations. We appreciate the support that the government of the ROK has given to Korea Defense Veterans and to the 2nd Infantry Division, both active and veterans over the years. We should all be proud to have played a part in helping to preserve South Korea’s freedoms.

The Second Indianhead Division Association will celebrate its 100th birthday in 2021, and it is only fitting that we celebrate this anniversary by honoring our fallen brothers and sisters from the Korean DMZ, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

This is a very important project for the Second Indianhead Division Association. We are currently estimating the cost of the project to be nearly $2 million. We know it is an ambitious project already, and it will take some time and extensive resources to bring it to reality, but we have made serious progress and we need help from all our compatriots and friends to continue. Fund raising will be a big challenge and any help that can be provided will be appreciated. Go to www.2IDA.org to see several of the presentations to help give you a better understanding of how we are trying to honor our fallen from Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Also at our 2IDA website, you can see how to donate to this very worthwhile effort.
Thank you to our sponsors

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Please support our partners with their important projects.

Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundation in Building the Korean War Veterans Memorial Wall of Remembrance

The Second Indianhead Division Association Memorials Foundation in its U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division Memorial Modification Project

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